koichiro matsuno/7129 (kmatsuno@vos.nagaokaut.ac.jp)
Sat, 20 Nov 1999 17:52:26 +0900 (JST)
Dear Stephen and All:
On Fri, 19 Nov 1999 01:30:45 -0500 Stephen Paul King
<stephenk1@home.com> wrote:
>By the way, are
>you familiar with the work of Howard Pattee?
>(http://www.c3.lanl.gov/~rocha/pattee/)
I think I have been pretty familiar with what Pattee has written.
His linguistic-dynamic complementarity is quite ontological despite
its outlook of being merely a matter of epistemology.
>> To define something indefinite definitely is a funny endeavor, but
>> let me give it a try. The present progressive is about an agency of
>> making distinctions in progress, and any material body is such an agency.
>Could we go so far as using this statement as a formal theorem? It is
>interesting in that it focuses on the capacity of "making distinctions
>in progress" as a fundamental property of material bodies. The notion of
>Local Systems (LS) as clocking agents follows a very similar vein. :-)
You are right. I wish I could do this by myself.
>The relationship between the finiteness of an observers spatial and
>temporal horizons and its ability to make distinctions is, I agree, very
>important! I have been thinking of the computational "simulation"
>capacities of a LS as being a measure of this finiteness toward the
>goal of a "bisimulational model of LS interaction.
Reading others and adjusting itself to the others on the part of any
clock are sequential but insepararable.
>We might consider this metaphorically as being a measure of how much
>can be "held consistent simultaneously". I think that we could agree
>that the complement of migrating inconsistencies is a moving locus of
>consistency.
Exactly.
>The idea of selectively applying the principle of the excluded middle
>(PEM) reminds me of my silly idea of constructing a set theory that is
>analogous to Riemannian geometry, the latter has a variable local
>geometry while the former would have a variable membership and/or
>subsethood...
I could see some of your sense. The real problem is how to implement
it.
>The way that records "freeze" consistencies, I believe, is important to
>note. But we should also note that the material in which the consistent
>record of distinctions is "engraved" is by no means eternal, it to
>degrades in the thermodynamic sense...
The material in the product is the record or memory allowing
constant overwriting upon it. It is not a ROM. In contrast, the material
body in progress is the carrier of moving inconsistencies. What is
specific to such a material body is that it can remain passively
immobile even momentarily until its inevitable next updating. Because of
this temporary tranquility, can one expect to associate the tranquility
with a representation of such a material body. If there is no duration of
tranquility between successive updating, there would be no likelihood of
having a material body serving also as a representation. Quarks could
have been a proper representation of the materials available right after
the Big Bang, while protein molecules must be a trustworthy
representation of the mateirials currently available in the biosphere on
the planet Earth. Any reliable material body is quite competent in
enclosing inside itself the migrating inconsistencies almost completely
but, of course, not quite. Those inconsistencies being squeezed out of
such a material body now serves as a means of implementing interactions
with the similar material bodies in the neighborhood in a bottom-up
manner.
>Umm, the notion that we could halt migrating inconsistencies by
>"cutting the whole into pieces" is
>interesting! It looks like the situation where a geometrical manifold
>where cut into small enough pieces, each piece would have zero
>curvature, while the whole could have non-zero curvature. This situation
>is exploited in General Relativity! The problem that I see is that the
>infinitesimal pieces can not contain clocks or rulers, as Hitoshi
>explains, so inconsistency is avoided by default!
I am pleased to know this fact.
>What I propose is that we consider each LS as an observer having a
>large but finite space-time framing at any given "instant" of their
>subjective measure of time, the migrating inconsistencies come into the
>picture when we consider any acceleration as a change of the total
>framing.
>In this regard I am in complete agreement with Matti's thinking! The
>"geometric time" is not the subjective time, it is a record of the
>precedence ordering within the frozen record. In other words, the flow
>of time in the subjective experiential sense is a shifting from one
>frozen Minkowskian manifold to another. This idea is still in a very
>primitive state and requires discussion! :-)
Time retrieved from the frozen consistent record in the present
perfect mode is not agential any more, while its genesis is local and
multi-agential. As far as the things registered in the present perfect
tense are concerned, I cannot see any problem with the standard
practice grounded upon formal language or axiomatic set-theory.
>I hope that you understand my interest in mathematical models, I
>wholeheartedly agree with your thinking with regards to the difficulties
>that it inherently creates. I am merely trying to generate a template or
>dictionary upon with to communicate effectively with our folks. :-)
Of course, it's quite fine with me.
>> Fuzzy set theory is quite rigid and artificial in saying how the
>> membership function should be defined. In other words, the theory is
>> extremely competent in coping with a fuzziness as a general universal.
>> By general universal, I mean a universal but not concrete enough. The
>> notion of a class is a representative case of general universals. The
>> definition of a class is an artifact at its best, for instance, by
>> finding a commonality among those pieces obtained by dissecting
>> something singularly unique.
>Can this be fixed? Pun intended :-)
No, this is an artifact at best. Sometimes, it would turn out to be
extremely useful.
>Bohm tended to focus on the moving point/field of explication, which we
>can see as the complement of migrating inconsistencies...
You have a very sympathetic view towards Bohm.
>> The mechanistic dynamics is
>> wonderfully peculiar in that the law of motion as a general universal
>> is claimed to be supplemented by non-dynamic boundary conditions as a
>> concrete particular. It cannot address dynamic boundary conditions as
>> dismissing the latter simply by declaration. In contrast, the dynamics
>> of migrating inconsistensies is intrinsically intensive in exercising
>> the capacity of leaving none of those inconsistencies behind in the
>> completed record.
>This clearly reveals the shortcomings of the conventional inductive
>models that assume universal initiality. By operating within
>asynchronous "windows" of consistency, we can have boundary conditions
>that are subjective (in that they apply to individual LSs) and not
>independent of context and history.
>I need to understand your notion of intensities better!
I remember that intensities were a favorite subject matter to
medieval Scholastic philosophers including Duns Scotus. Intensities were
taken to be the agency of individuation. This idea has survived even
until now though in a very restricted form known as boundary conditions
that are already deprived of dynamic capacity of changinging themselves.
>> What are classes must be an empirical issue rather than a theoretical
>> one. This is my tentative bid.
>Ok, but is it not an empirical model of time that we are seeking?
>Perhaps I am confused... :-)
Yeah, you are absolutely right!
>> The issue is again about the nature of time. If globally synchronous tim
e
>> is sanctioned from the start, the mechanistic scheme would survive there.
>> Potential and kinetic energies complete their whatever transactions
>> instantaneously in the globally consistent manner. On the other hand,
>> potential energy as a non-frozen leftover of migrating inconsistencies coul
d
>> survive only when time is taken to be locally asynchronous on the spot.
>Yes, I agree! Hitoshi's model, in showing that there can be no time
>associated with the Universe as a whole, denies globally synchronous
>time a priori. The best we can get is an asymptotic approximation of
>such in the limit od infinite interactions among the LSs! ;^)
Or, the whole Universe is a gigantic clock. But there is no one who
can read it as such, and accordingly no time because time is intrinsically
relational.
>> Energy in general or potential energy in particular in locally
>> asynchronous time incorporates into itself the capacity of constraining
>> or cocretization. This attribute is nothing other than what we know under
>> the banner of information, though I do know I have to do a lot of homework
>> to convince our folks on this point.
>I don't need much convincing of this idea, I think that it is correct.
>:-)
I am glad to hear that.
>We do, on the other hand, need to flesh out our thinking and notions so
>that we can work toward implementation of the physics that is implied.
>:-)
One strategy must be to implement interactions in a bottom-up manner
instead of a top-down. That is to say putting small clocks together one
by one.
Cheers,
Koichiro Matsuno
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